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Salvadorans are proving a penchant for patience when it comes to President Mauricio Funes, who
continues to enjoy strong popular support despite having only limited success in tackling the
country’s two most pressing problems: crime and the economy.
In 2009, the year Funes took office (NotiCen, June 4, 2009), El Salvador’s already frighteningly
high murder rate soared, jumping 34% to a grim total of 4,382—an average of 12 per day. The
new president, a former television journalist backed by the leftist Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional (FMLN), inherited an equally dire economic scenario. El Salvador’s economy,
dragged down by global financial woes, contracted 3.5% in 2009.
Funes reacted to the crime epidemic by employing a series of tough law-and-order measures
targeted primarily at the country’s notorious maras (street gangs). Within months of taking office he
decided to involve the military in crime-fighting activities (NotiCen, Oct. 29, 2009). More recently,
his government rushed through an "anti-gang" law that outlaws the very existence of the violent
maras, also known as pandillas(NotiCen, Oct. 14, 2010 ).
Whether because of Funes’ actions or not, violent crime did dip somewhat in 2010. Murders dropped
9% from the previous year’s macabre peak, down to 3,985, according to the Policía Nacional Civil
(PNC). It would be a stretch, however, to suggest Funes is "winning" the war on violent crime.
With an average last year of nearly 11 killings per day, El Salvador was still one of the most violent
nonconflict zones not only in Latin America but in the world.
El Salvador’s economic figures told a similar story in 2010. Technically the recession ended, though
not by much. The Salvadoran economy expanded by a mere 0.5% on the year, falling short of the
already modest 1% growth figure many economists had predicted.
Analysts blame the limited turnaround on slow economic recovery in the US, on which El Salvador’s
economy is highly dependent. The US alone buys approximately 48% of the Central America
country’s total exports. It is also home to an estimated 2.5 million Salvadorans whose combined
remittances (averaging about US$4 billion annually) are El Salvador’s number-one source of
revenue, accounting for roughly 17% of GDP.
Yet for all the disappointment the stagnant economy and ongoing security concerns may have
caused El Salvador’s 6.1 million residents, the largely unresolved violence and poverty problems
have yet to make much of a dent in Funes’ level of popular support.
A CID/Gallup poll released in mid-December put the president’s approval rating at 74%, well
ahead of Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli as the most popular leader in Central America. A
survey published one week earlier by LPG Datos estimated support for the president at 69%, while a
recent poll by Consulta Mitofsky gave him a 79% approval rating, the highest of any Latin American
president.
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"I congratulate myself because this means, despite the difficulties, that the people have the wisdom
to understand that changes don’t come about from one day to the next," President Funes told
reporters Dec. 19.
"I never said changes would occur immediately. I inherited a state with battered public finances. I
also inherited institutions with high levels of corruption, [a country] with the highest crime rate in
Latin America—maybe even in the whole world—and a country that depends on remittances as its
principal source of revenue. With the financial crisis in the United States, [remittances] were one
of things hardest hit. Tax revenues also dropped. Companies closed. The principal sectors of our
national industries are practically disjointed," Funes added.

An attractive alternative
Patience—and a sense that problems like the US financial crisis are indeed beyond the president’s
reach—may explain in part why so much of the Salvadoran public continues to support Funes. Polls
suggest Funes is also being rewarded for implementing certain popular social programs. Under his
leadership, the government has expanded low-income health services and provided free uniforms
and shoes to poor school children.
Funes’ biggest selling point, however, may be his "third-way" approach to El Salvador’s traditionally
polarized political scene. Hailed initially as El Salvador’s first leftist president, Funes has instead
proven himself to be a moderate, charting an independent course that sets him apart from the
country’s traditional political extremes: the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), the
conservative party he defeated in the 2009 election, and the FMLN, the far-left party Funes
represented.
"He’s trying to be more centrist, more moderate....He’s a more modern president than El Salvador
has had," Peter Hakim of the Washington D.C. think tank Inter-American Dialogue told NotiCen.
"He has his own group around him that rejected some of the extremism of the FMLN. It created an
alternative for Salvadoran voters who were forced up to this point to vote either for ARENA or the
extreme left, both of which became less and less attractive as time went on. He still represents that
alternative."
But while Funes’ moderate approach may have won him support among the general public, it has
also made for some prickly relationships with his political peers. Opposed on the right by ARENA,
which dominated Salvadoran politics for two decades before losing the 2009 election, Funes also has
an increasing number of critics in the FMLN.
The president’s relationship with the FMLN, a party that originated as a coalition of revolutionary
guerrilla organizations during El Salvador's 1980-1992 civil war, began in many ways as a marriage
of convenience. Funes, never actually a member of the FMLN, needed a major party to back him,
while the FMLN needed a more mainstream candidate to soften its radical image and finally beat
ARENA at the polls.
The formula worked. Funes edged past ARENA candidate Rodrigo Ávila 51% to 49% to hand the
FMLN the presidency (NotiCen, March 19, 2009). The FMLN also scored big in 2009’s municipal and
parliamentary elections, winning a majority of El Salvador’s mayoral posts and taking 35 of 84 seats
in the unicameral Asamblea Legislativa (AL).
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Since then, however, Funes has made it clear that he, not the FMLN, holds executive power in El
Salvador, differing openly—and frequently—with the party on several key issues. To the FMLN’s
disappointment, Funes has kept Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez at arm’s length, declining an
invitation to join the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) trade group.
He also ruffled feathers in the FMLN by normalizing relations with neighboring Honduras, where
a coup in June 2009 deposed then President Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009), a leftist and Chávez ally
(NotiCen, July 2, 2009). Honduras is now led by conservative President Porfirio Lobo, who won a
November 2009 election organized by the country’s interim government. FMLN leaders called the
election "a farce."
"The bride and groom knew they had there differences, but they didn’t really know to what degree,"
political analyst Rafael Castellanos told the Spanish news agency EFE. "Funes either didn’t think or
hadn’t studied the situation enough to know that the FMLN would be so fast and direct in wanting
to advance toward [Chávez-style] 21st century socialism. At the same time, the FMLN didn’t expect
[Funes] to be such an independent, challenging president who fights tooth and nail for what he
wants."

"Schizophrenic" bedfellows
Observers are now wondering if the tempestuous Funes-FMLN relationship is heading toward a
full-fledged divorce, especially in light of classified US government cables filtered to the press last
month by the international nonprofit group .
In a series of secret cables filed between August 2009 and January 2010, US Embassy official
Robert Blau expressed concern about the stability of the Salvadoran government, describing the
relationship between Funes and the FMLN as "schizophrenic."
"The part of the government that Funes controls is moderate, pragmatic, responsibly left-of-center
and friendly to the US government," the cable reads. "The part he has ceded to hard-line elements
of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front is seeking to carry out the Bolivarian, Chavista
game-plan, including implacable hostility toward the US government."
President Funes, another of the cables suggests, was at one point concerned about his "physical
security" and asked for security assistance from the US. Funes was also concerned that his security
apparatus, the Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado (OIE), had withheld information from him and
possibly bugged his telephones. The OIE is headed by FMLN veteran Eduardo Linares.
"Funes’ ego has little chance of rapprochement with the hard-line FMLN. If things continue to
deteriorate, we could see an open break between the two sides, possibly resulting in a new alliance
between Funes and an existing party...for the 2012 legislative elections," one of the cables reads.
Whether such a break will come to pass is debatable. Funes may be winning popularity points by
keeping his distance from the FMLN, but he still needs its backing in the AL to pass legislation. At
the same time, the FMLN—to maintain its recent electoral gains—will no doubt welcome future
opportunities to cash in on the president’s high approval ratings.
To maintain his popularity, however, Funes may eventually have to offer voters more than charm
and a refreshing middle-ground approach. So far, slow progress on the crime and economic fronts
has not hurt him politically. That’s not likely to remain the case forever.
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"The economy is going to play a big role. A sour economy will take its toll, just as an inability to deal
with the security issue will take a toll. I don’t think there’s any question," said Hakim. "The ARENA
party is still a real threat...somehow I think ARENA is not down and out yet."

-- End --
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